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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis initiated in 2008 triggered a deep and prolonged setback
for aggregate demand in all major industrialized economies, paving the way for per-
sistently low ination rates. In the European Monetary Union (EMU), the crisis has
also revealed forcefully the imbalances and e¢ ciency gaps across its member states.
In most of the so-called periphery, the combination of high indebtedness, deleverag-
ing and widespread dysfunctionalities in labor and product markets is feeding fears
of a long-lasting scenario of weak and fragile growth, with adverse consequences for
the entire union.
Against this context, many voices are calling for a simultaneous implementation
of supply and demand side policies within the EMU. On the supply side, the removal
of ine¢ ciencies and the enhancement of market competition are invoked as the only
lever available to the periphery so as to regain its competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest
of the EMU. On the demand side, given that the periphery lacks su¢ cient scal
space to stimulate domestic demand and that the European Central Bank is already
constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB), the attention has shifted towards the
role of non-standard monetary policies and the possibility of expansionary scal
measures in the core. Moreover, the policy debate has progressively moved towards
two closely interlinked areas: rst, the potential for policy-induced spillovers across
countries within EMU and, second, the likely complementarities or synergies between
non-standard monetary policy, structural reforms, and scal policy.1
The issue of scal spillovers in a monetary union has recently been the subject of
formal quantitative analysis, e.g. by Erceg and Lindé (2013) and Blanchard, Erceg
and Lindé (2014). However, relatively less is known about cross-country spillovers
induced by the adoption of structural reforms in one part of the union. Critically,
even less is known about the potential synergies between such structural reforms,
scal expansion in the rest of the union, and non-conventional monetary policies at
the union level.
In this paper, we address these issues in the context of a model of an asymmetric
1See, for example, Draghi (2014, 2015), European Commission (2014) and IMF (2014).
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two-country (coreand periphery) monetary union. In both countries, households
and rms borrow long-term subject to collateral constraints. We construct a baseline
scenario aimed at capturing key features of the current macroeconomic landscape in
the EMU. First, the periphery is assumed to be hit by an adverse nancial shock that
tightens the collateral requirements on the loans to households and rms. This shock,
combined with collateral constraints and long-run debt, gives rise to a protracted and
costly process of deleveraging in the periphery with implications for the monetary
union as a whole. Second, a union-wide demand shock causes a reduction in union-
wide ination that is large enough to drive the monetary authoritys nominal interest
rate towards its ZLB. Both shocks combine to produce a long-lasting recession and
persistently low ination in the currency union as a whole.
Against this background, we analyze the e¤ects of two types of country-specic
macroeconomic policies: structural reforms in the periphery (consisting of reductions
in price and wage-settersmonopolistic rents), and a temporary increase in govern-
ment spending in the core. We show that the cross-country spillovers of such policies
depend critically on the incidence of the ZLB. Outside of the ZLB, structural re-
forms have a positive output e¤ect on the periphery already on impact, but produce
a slight positive impact on the core too, thanks to the monetary accommodation of
the ensuing disinationary pressures. A government expenditure expansion in the
core, on the contrary, aggravates the recession in the periphery, as the central bank
tightens its policy rate in response to the inationary pressures coming from the
core. By contrast, in a liquidity trap the sign of the previous cross-country spillovers
are reversed. First, reforms in the periphery, which remain expansionary for the lat-
ter although less so, produce a negative (though relatively small) e¤ect on the core.
Similarly, absent the previously discussed monetary tightening, a scal expansion in
the core produces sizeable positive spillovers for the periphery.
We next consider the possibility that the monetary authority follows a forward
guidancepolicy with the aim of raising area-wide GDP and ination while in the
liquidity trap. In particular, we analyze the case in which the central bank can cred-
ibly commit to keeping the interest rate at zero for two more quarters than what
its standard rule would dictate. Such a policy is found to have positive e¤ects, of a
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similar magnitude, in the output of both regions. This last result is remarkable be-
cause, during the deleveraging phase (which lasts longer than the liquidity trap in our
simulations), the credit ow in the periphery is frozen, such that credit-constrained
agents are not exposed to the usual intertemporal consumption substitution channel
of forward guidance. Thus, in our setup the e¤ectiveness of forward guidance on the
periphery seems to be more related to other transmission channels, such as the core-
periphery trade channel and net worth e¤ects on the balance-sheets of deleveraging
agents.
We then quantify the synergies between the three policies, an exercise for which
our nonlinear model (and our fully nonlinear solution method) is well suited. We
nd that the short-run expansionary e¤ects of national stimulus measures (reforms
in the Periphery and scal expansion in the Core) increases by a sizable amount
when in parallel the monetary authority implements a policy of forward guidance.
Conversely, the expansionary impact of forward guidance is largely enhanced when at
the same time each country implements its respective policy package. Importantly,
these positive synergies take place both for the monetary union as a whole and for
each individual country.
We identify two prominent channels for these synergies. On the one hand,
country-specic policies produce expansionary e¤ects that run beyond the short term,
especially in the case of structural reforms that may deploy permanent e¤ects on
output. Thus, the forward-guidance-driven reduction in long-run real interest rates
raises the present-discounted value of such gains, via income and net worth e¤ects,
with the resulting positive e¤ect on current consumption and investment (discounting
e¤ect). On the other hand, di¤erent country-specic policies have di¤erent e¤ects on
the endogenous path of the nominal interest rate when the latter follows a standard
ZLB-constrained Taylor rule, both in terms of the date at which the nominal rate
exits the ZLB (the lift-o¤ date) and the intensity of its rise once outside the ZLB; we
may refer to this channel as the lift-o¤ e¤ect. In particular, inationary demand-side
policies such as a scal expansion in the Core enjoy a positive lift-o¤ e¤ect, whereas
the opposite is true for deationary supply-side policies such as product market re-
forms in the Periphery. Our analysis stresses the importance of jointly implementing
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forward guidance and both supply- and demand-side country-specic policies, as it
is this package that brings together the discounting and (positive) lift-o¤ e¤ects and
thus maximizes the positive synergies.
Related literature. By analyzing the joint implementation of demand and
supply side policies, we contribute to a long-standing tradition in macroeconomics,
with early contributions by Blanchard et al. (1985), Buiter (1987) and Bean (1994),
among others. Our paper revisits this topic in the context of a quantitative modern
dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) framework.
More specically, our paper contributes to the literature on the evaluation of
macroeconomic policies in a currency union in the context of quantitative DGE
models. Our analysis shares several themes with previous contributions, such as the
e¤ects of national policies (scal expansion/consolidation, structural reforms, etc.),
cross-country spillovers of such policies, the role of the ZLB in shaping the impact
of such policies, and the e¤ects of forward guidance by the monetary authorities in
the face of a binding ZLB. Relative to this literature, which we summarize next,
one important contribution is that we analyze quantitatively the synergies between
national policies and (non-standard) union-wide monetary measures, in sync with
recent policy debates in the EMU.
A recent literature studies the e¤ects of country-specic scal policies, and the
associated cross-country spillovers, in two-country monetary union models. Erceg
and Lindé (2013) analyze di¤erent strategies of scal consolidation by one country,
with a particular attention to the constraints imposed by currency union membership,
including the possibility of a binding ZLB. In a similar framework, Blanchard, Erceg
and Lindé (2014) study the spillovers of scal expansion in one country to the other
under di¤erent assumptions about the incidence of the ZLB or the degree of home bias
in government purchases, as well as the welfare implications of such an expansion. In
addition to the analysis of synergies discussed above, we also build on this literature
by studying the cross-country spillovers of structural reforms in one part of the
currency union and how such spillovers depend on whether the ZLB binds or not.
The role of forward guidance about future interest rates as a means of allevi-
ating the restrictions imposed by the ZLB is the subject of a recent and growing
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literature, after the seminal theoretical analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Levin et al. (2010), Campbell, Fisher and Justiniano (2012), Del Negro and Gi-
annoni (2013), Benigno, Eggertsson and Romei (2014) and McKay, Nakamura and
Steinsson (2015) are some notable recent examples of DSGE model-based analyses
of forward guidance. We complement this literature by studying, in the context of
a multi-country monetary union model, the interaction between forward guidance
and di¤erent country/region-specic macroeconomic policies, both supply-side (in
the periphery) and demand-side ones (in the core). Our analysis reveals an impor-
tant role of forward-guidance in strengthening the expansionary e¤ects of national
supply and demand side policies.
Our paper is also related to a recent literature that studies the e¤ects of structural
reforms, via reductions in price and/or wage markups, in a currency union where the
monetary authority is either constrained by the ZLB (Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-
Quintana and Rubio-Ramírez, 2012; Eggertsson, Ferrero and Ra¤o, 2014; Gerali, No-
tarpietro and Pisani, 2015) or by its concern for nominal exchange rate stabilization
(Galí and Monacelli, 2014). One contribution of our analysis to this line of research
is to add scal expansion by the core countries in the union and forward guidance by
the monetary authority, and to study the resulting complementarities across these
policies.
Finally, Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2015) study the e¤ects of structural reforms
in a small open economy that belongs to a monetary union (with the resulting lack
of monetary accommodation) and undergoes a prolonged process of private-sector
deleveraging due to the coexistence of long-term debt, collateral constraints and a
negative nancial shock. As argued by those authors, the assumption of long-term
debt brings model debt dynamics closer to those observed in actual deleveraging
episodes, both historical ones and those currently ongoing in the EMU periphery.
We build on their analyses by considering a two-country monetary union structure,
which allows us to analyze the cross-country spillovers created by country-specic
policies, as well as the synergies between such country-specic policies and the com-
mon monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and
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presents the calibration and solution method. Section 3 constructs our main baseline
scenario, which includes a binding ZLB and deleveraging in the periphery. Section
4 analyzes the e¤ects of country-specic macroeconomic policies (structural reforms
in the periphery, scal expansion in the core) and forward guidance by the common
monetary authority, both with and without ZLB. It then quanties the synergies
between these policies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We now present a general equilibrium model of a monetary union with two countries
or regions: the Periphery (denoted by H) and the Core (denoted by F ). The
union-wide population is normalized to 1, where a fraction s live in the Periphery
and the remaining 1  s in the Core.
The real side of the economy is fairly standard. In each country, households
obtain utility from consumption goods and from housing units. Consumption goods
are produced using a combination of household labor, commercial real estate and
equipment capital goods. Construction rms build real estate (both for residential
and commercial purposes) using labor and consumption goods; the latter are also
used as inputs by equipment capital goods producers. Consumption-goods and labor
markets are both characterized by monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities.
On the nancial side, the structure is as follows. In each country, there are three
types of consumers: patient households, impatient households, and (impatient) en-
trepreneurs. In equilibrium, the latter two borrow from the former and from lenders
in the other country. Debt contracts are long-term. In periods in which borrowers
are able to receive new credit ows, they do so subject to collateral constraints. If
the value of their collateral is too low for them to receive new credit ows, they just
repay their outstanding debts at a xed contractual rate. Real estate is the only
collateralizable asset. We will henceforth refer to impatient and patient households
as constrainedand unconstrainedhouseholds, respectively.
Finally, a common monetary authority sets the nominal policy interest rate using
a standard Taylor rule and subject to the ZLB constraints.
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All variables are in real terms and in per capita unless otherwise specied, with the
consumption goods basket of each country acting as the numeraire in that country.
From now onwards, we focus on the model structure in the Periphery country.2 The
Core country is modelled analogously. All equilibrium conditions, including rst-
order conditions of agentsoptimization problems, are listed in Appendix A.
2.1 Households
There is a representative constrained household and a representative unconstrained
household, denoted respectively by superscripts c and u.
2.1.1 Cost minimization
Before analyzing dynamic household optimization, we rst derive the static cost mini-
mization problem, which is common to both households types (and to entrepreneurs).
Households consume a basket of home and foreign goods, denoted respectively by
subscripts H and F ,
cxt =

!
1="H
H
 
cxH;t
("H 1)="H + (1  !H)1="H  cxF;t("H 1)="H"H=("H 1) ; (1)
for x = c; u; cxH;t and c
x
F;t are baskets of Home and Foreign good varieties, respectively,
cxH;t =
Z 1
0
cxH;t (z)
("p 1)="p dz
"p=("p 1)
; (2)
cxF;t =
Z 1
0
cxF;t (z
0)("

p 1)="p dz0
"p=("p 1)
; (3)
where "p; "p > 1 are the elasticities of substitution across Home and Foreign good va-
rieties, respectively. Let PH;t (z) and PF;t (z0) denote the prices of Home good variety
2Given our focus on the decision problems from the point of view of the agents in the Periphery,
we will also refer to them as Home agents, and to agents in the Core as Foreign agents. Likewise,
goods produced in the Periphery and the Core will also be referred to as Home and Foreign goods,
respectively.
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z and Foreign good variety z0 respectively. Household x = c; u minimizes nominal
consumption expenditure,
R 1
0
PH;t (z) c
x
H;t (z) dz +
R 1
0
PF;t (z
0) cxF;t (z
0) dz0, subject to
(1), (2) and (3). The rst order conditions can be expressed as
cxH;t = !H

PH;t
Pt
 "H
cxt ; c
x
F;t = (1  !H)

PF;t
Pt
 "H
cxt ; (4)
cxH;t (z) =

PH;t (z)
PH;t
 "p
cxH;t; c
x
F;t (z
0) =

PF;t (z
0)
PF;t
 "p
cxF;t;
for z; z0 2 [0; 1], where
Pt =
 
!HP
1 "H
H;t + (1  !H)P 1 "HF;t
1=(1 "H)
; PH;t =
Z 1
0
PH;t (z)
1 "p dz
1=(1 "p)
are the Peripherys consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI),
respectively, and where
PF;t =
Z 1
0
PF;t (z
0)1 "

p dz0
1=(1 "p)
is a price index of Foreign goods. Nominal spending in Home and Foreign goods equalR 1
0
PH;t (z) c
x
H;t (z) dz = PH;tc
x
H;t and
R 1
0
PF;t (z
0) cxF;t (z
0) dz0 = PF;tcxF;t, respectively,
whereas total nominal consumption spending equals PH;tcxH;t + PF;tc
x
F;t = Ptc
x
t .
As noted before, consumption goods are also used as inputs by construction
rms and equipment capital producers. The latter are assumed to combine home
and foreign goods analogously to households. This gives rise to investment demand
functions analogous to (4).
2.1.2 Unconstrained households
The unconstrained household maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
(u)t t
(
log (cut ) + # log (h
u
t )  
Z 1
0
nut (i)
1+'
1 + '
di
)
;
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where t is a union-wide shock to the discount factor of all consumers, n
u
t (i) are
labor services of type i 2 [0; 1] and hut are housing units, subject to the following
budget constraint (expressed in units of the consumption goods basket),
cut + dt + p
h
t

hut   (1  h)hut 1

=
Rt 1
t
dt 1 + (1  w)
Z 1
0
Wt (i)
Pt
nut (i) di  Tt;
where dt is the real value of net holdings of riskless nominal debt, Rt is the gross
nominal interest rate at which Home agents lend and borrow, h is the depreciation
rate of real estate, pht is the real price of real estate, t  Pt=Pt 1 is gross CPI
ination, Wt (i) is the nominal wage for labor services of type i, w is a tax rate on
labor income and Tt are lump-sum taxes.
2.1.3 Constrained households
The constrained households preferences are given by
E0
1X
t=0
tt
(
log (cct) + # log (ht)  
Z 1
0
nct (i)
1+'
1 + '
di
)
;
where  < u, i.e. the constrained household is relatively impatient. The household
faces the following budget constraint,
cct + p
h
t [ht   (1  h)ht 1] = bt  
Rt 1
t
bt 1 + (1  w)
Z 1
0
Wt (i)
Pt
nct (i) di  Tt;
where bt is the real value of household debt outstanding at the end of period t.
Unlike in most of the literature, which typically assumes short-term (one-period)
debt, we assume that debt contracts are long-term. In the interest of tractability, we
assume that at the beginning of time t the household repays a fraction 1    of all
nominal debt outstanding at the end of period t   1, regardless of when that debt
was issued.3 This type of perpetual debt is similar to the one proposed by Woodford
3Total (gross) debt payments in each period are then (1  ) + (Rt 1   1) times nominal debt
outstanding, i.e. the sum of amortization and interest payments.
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(2001) as a tractable way of modelling long-term debt. In real terms, the outstanding
principal of household debt then evolves as follows,
bt =
bt 1
t
+ bnewt   (1  )
bt 1
t
= bnewt + 
bt 1
t
; (5)
where bnewt is gross new credit net of voluntary amortizations, i.e. amortizations
beyond the contractual debt repayment (1  ) bt 1=t.
We assume that, in normal times(in a sense to be specied below), household
borrowing is subject to collateral constraints, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Fol-
lowing Iacoviello (2005), outstanding debt bt cannot exceed a fraction mt (the loan-
to-value ratio, which we assume to be exogenously time-varying) of the expected
discounted value of the households residential stock: bt  mtR 1t Ett+1pht+1ht. For
brevity, we will refer to such pledgeable value of collateral as collateral value. This
debt limit, however, is only e¤ective as long as it exceeds bt 1=t, which we will
henceforth refer to as the contractual amortization path. Indeed, if the collateral value
falls below such path, lowering bt to the value of collateral would require lenders not
only to reduce gross new credit to zero (its lower bound), but also to impose ad-
ditional amortizations beyond those agreed in the contract (i.e. bnewt < 0). Since
lenders cannot force borrowers to pay back faster than the contractual amortization
rate, the contractual amortization path becomes the e¤ective debt limit. Therefore,
long run debt implies the following asymmetric borrowing constraint,
bt  R 1t mtEtt+1pht+1ht; if
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1ht  
bt 1
t
; (6)
bt   bt 1
t
; if
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1ht < 
bt 1
t
: (7)
This asymmetry gives rise to a double debt regime. In normal timesin which collat-
eral values exceed the contractual amortization path, debt is restricted by the former.
In this baseline regime, households can receive new credit against their housing col-
lateral, with the constraint that such new credit does not exceed the gap between
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collateral values and the amortization path.4 However, in the face of shocks that
reduce collateral values su¢ ciently, the economy switches to an alternative regime,
in which new credit disappears and debt is restricted instead by the contractual
amortization path. Notice that changes from one regime to the other take place
endogenously, and may thus be a¤ected by policy or by other shocks.
For future reference, we obtain here the optimal choice of housing,
ctp
h
t =
t#
ht
+ Et
c
t+1 (1  h) pht+1 + t
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1; (8)
where xt = t=c
x
t and t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget
constraint of consumer type x = c; u; e and to the collateral constraint (eq. 6),
respectively. Equation (8) illustrates that, when the collateral constraint is binding
(t > 0), the marginal value of housing is higher due to the possibility of borrowing
against it. This possibility disappears once the economy enters into the alternative
debt regime, in which the collateral constraint ceases to be e¤ective.
2.2 Production
Entrepreneurs produce an intermediate good and sell it to retailers, who transform
it into consumption good varieties. Entrepreneurs and retailers conform the con-
sumption goods sector. In addition, construction rms produce real estate, both for
residential and commercial use, whereas equipment capital is produced by capital
goods producers. All sectors operate under perfect competition, except retailers who
enjoy monopolistic power.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
A representative entrepreneur produces an intermediate product and sells it to re-
tailers at a perfectly competitive real (CPI-deated) price mct. The entrepreneur
4Indeed, from (5) and (6) we obtain bnewt  mtR 1t Ett+1pht+1ht   bt 1=t.
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maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
tt log c
e
t ;
with the consumption basket cet dened analogously to (1), subject to
cet+p
h
t

het   (1  h)het 1

+qt [kt   (1  k) kt 1] = mctyet 
Wt
Pt
net+b
e
t 
Rt 1
t
bet 1+
X
s=r;h;k
st ;
yet = k
k
t 1
 
het 1
h (net )1 k h ;
where yet is output of the intermediate good, kt 1 is equipment capital with unit price
qt, k is the depreciation rate of equipment capital, het 1 is commercial real estate,
net is a basket of labor services, Wt is a nominal wage index, b
e
t is the real value
of entrepreneurial debt outstanding at the end of period t, and fstgs=r;h;k are real
prots from the retail, construction and equipment goods-producing sectors.5
Entrepreneursmaximization is also subject to an asymmetric borrowing con-
straint analogous to the one on constrained households,
bet  R 1t metEtt+1pht+1het ; if
met
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t  e
bet 1
t
; (9)
bet  e
bet 1
t
; if
met
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < 
e b
e
t 1
t
; (10)
where we allow for a di¤erent loan-to-value ratio (met) and contractual amortization
rate (1   e) for entrepreneurs. Again, it is instructive to analyze here the optimal
demand for commercial real estate,
etp
h
t = Et
e
t+1

mct+1h
yet+1
het
+ (1  h) pht+1

+ et
met
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1; (11)
where et is the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraint (9). Analogously to
the case of constrained households, in periods in which the collateral constraint
5Notice that entrepreneurs are assumed to own the rms in the latter sectors. We adopt this
specication because we are interested in analyzing how prot accumulation a¤ects productive
investment decisions, which in our model are made by the entrepreneurs.
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binds (et > 0) the marginal value of commercial real estate is higher thanks to the
possibility of borrowing against it.
2.2.2 Retailers
A continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by z 2 [0; 1] purchase
the intermediate input from entrepreneurs at the real price mct, and transform it
one for one into nal good varieties. Retailersreal marginal cost is thus mct. Each
retailer z faces a demand curve
yt (z) =

PH;t (z)
PH;t
 "p
yt  ydt (PH;t (z)) ; (12)
where yt is aggregate demand of the basket of Home goods (to be derived below).
Assuming Calvo (1983) price-setting, a retailer that has the chance of setting its
nominal price at time t solves
max
PH;t(z)
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s 
e
t+s
et

(1   p) PH;t (z)
Pt+s
 mct+s

ydt+s (PH;t (z)) ;
where p is the probability of not adjusting the price and  p is a tax rate on retailers
revenue. The rst-order condition is standard (see Appendix), with all time-t price
setters choosing a common optimal price ~PH;t. If retailers were able to reset prices
in every period (p = 0), they would set
~PH;t =
1
1   p
"p
"p   1Ptmct:
Therefore, the term 1
1 p
"p
"p 1 represents the desired price markup over nominal mar-
ginal cost, and thus measures the degree of monopolistic distortions in product mar-
kets.
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2.2.3 Construction rms
A representative construction rm maximizes its expected discounted stream of prof-
its, E0
P1
t=0 
t et
e0
ht , where 
h
t = p
h
t I
h
t   WtPt nht   iht , subject to the production tech-
nology
Iht =
 
nht
!(
iht
"
1  h
2

iht
iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
;
where nht are labor services, i
h
t are consumption goods, and I
h
t are new real estate
units.6
2.2.4 Equipment capital producers
A representative equipment capital producer maximizes its expected discounted
stream of prots, E0
P1
t=0 
t et
e0
kt , where 
k
t = qtIt   it, subject to the technology
It = it
"
1  k
2

it
it 1
  1
2#
;
where it are consumption goods, and It are new equipment capital goods.
2.3 Wage setting
Both entrepreneurs and construction rms use a basket of labor services by con-
strained and unconstrained households,
nst = (n
s;c
t )
s (ns;ut )
1 s ;
where ns;xt are labor services provided by type-x household, x = c; u, to each sector
s = e; h. We assume that both worker types (constrained and unconstrained) earn
the same wage. Cost minimization then implies (1  s)ns;ct = sns;ut , for s = e; h.
6We include labor services in the production function of construction rms so as to allow for
long-run changes in real estate prices. Without labor in construction (! = 0), real estate prices are
always unity in the long run. More generally, it can be shown that phss = (wss)
!
! ! (1  !) (1 !).
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From each household type, each sector demands in turn a basket of labor service
varieties,
ns;xt =
Z 1
0
ns;xt (i)
("w 1)="w di
"w=("w 1)
;
for x = c; u and s = e; h, where "w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across
labor varieties i 2 [0; 1]. Cost minimization implies ns;xt (i) = (Wt (i) =Wt) "w ns;xt ,
for x = c; u and s = e; h, where Wt  (
R 1
0
Wt (i)
1 "w di)1=(1 "w) is the nominal wage
index. Total demand for each variety of labor services is thus
nxt (i)  ne;xt (i) + nh;xt (i) =

Wt (i)
Wt
 "w 
ne;xt + n
h;x
t

 nd;xt (Wt (i)) ;
for x = c; u. Total nominal wage income earned by each type-x household equalsR 1
0
Wt (i)n
x
t (i) di = Wtn
x
t , where n
x
t  ne;xt + nh;xt .
As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000; EHL), nominal wages are set à la Calvo
(1983). In particular, a union representing all type-i workers maximizes the utility
of the households to which such workers belong. Then a union that has the chance
to reset the nominal wage at time t chooses Wt (i) to maximize
X
x=c;u
Et
1X
s=0
(xw)
s
264xt+s (1  w) Wt (i)Pt+s nd;xt+s (Wt (i))  t+s

nd;xt+s (Wt (i))
1+'
1 + '
375 ;
where w is the probability of not adjusting the wage and 
c = . All time-t wage-
setters choose a common optimal wage ~Wt; see the rst-order condition in the Ap-
pendix. If workers were able to reset wages in every period (w = 0), then they
would charge a markup
1
1  w
"w
"w   1
over a weighted average of constrained and unconstrained householdsmarginal rates
of substitution between consumption and labor. Therefore, the term 1
1 w
"w
"w 1 rep-
resents the desired wage markup, and thus measures the degree of monopolistic dis-
tortions in the labor market.
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2.4 Fiscal authority
The scal authority demands a basket of Home good varieties analogous to (2), which
we denote by gt and is exogenously determined. Thus, government demand for each
Home variety z is gt (z) = (PH;t (z) =PH;t)
 "p gt. Assuming full home bias in govern-
ment purchases, the total nominal value of government purchases is
R 1
0
PH;t (z) gt (z) dz =
PH;tgt. For simplicity, we assume that the scal authority balances its budget period-
by-period by adjusting lump-sum taxes Tt,
w
Wt
Pt
(nct + n
u
t ) +  p
PH;t
Pt
yt + 2Tt =
PH;t
Pt
gt:
2.5 Common monetary authority
The common monetary authority sets the gross nominal policy interest rate RMUt
according to a simple ination-based Taylor rule and subject to the zero bound on
net interest rates,
RMUt = max

1; RMU
 
MUt
	 ; (13)
where  > 1, R
MU is the long-run target for the policy rate, and
MUt = st + (1  s) t
is a measure of the union-wide gross CPI ination rate, where t  P t =P t 1 is
Foreign CPI ination.
2.6 International linkages
In section 2.1.1 we derived Home agentsoptimal demand for imported (Foreign)
goods. As regards the exports side of international trade, we assume that Foreign
agents demand baskets of Home good varieties analogous to (2), denoted by ccH;t,
cuH;t, etc. The law of one price is assumed to hold for each Home good variety, such
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that P H;t (z) = PH;t (z) for all z 2 [0; 1], implying P H;t = PH;t.7 Thus, export demand
for each Home good variety z is xt (z) = (PH;t (z) =PH;t)
 "p xt, where real per capita
exports equal
xt =
1  s
s
 
ccH;t + c
u
H;t + c
e
H;t + i

H;t + i
h
H;t

=
1  s
s
(1  !F )

PH;t
P t
 "F  
cct + c
u
t + c
e
t + i

t + i
h
t

: (14)
In equation (14), !F and "F are the relative weight on Foreign goods and the elasticity
of substitution between Home and Foreign goods, respectively, in Foreign agents
consumption and investment baskets, P t is the Cores CPI, and z

t , z = c
c; cu; ce; i; ih,
are per capita demand for Home goods by the di¤erent Foreign agents.
As mentioned before, Home agents can lend to and borrow from foreigners and
other domestic agents at a riskless nominal rate Rt. We denote by
nfat  dt   bt   bet (15)
the Peripherys real (CPI-deated) per capita net foreign asset position. Following
standard practice in the literature, in order to guarantee stationarity of the net
foreign asset position, we assume that Rt is given by
Rt = R
MU
t exp

  Ptnfat
PH;tgdpt

;
where  > 0 and gdpt is the real (PPI-deated) per capita GDP, to be derived later.
2.7 Aggregation and market clearing
Each retailer z demands ydt (PH;t (z)) units of the intermediate input, as given by
(12). Total demand for the latter equals
R 1
0
ydt (PH;t (z)) dz = ytt, where t R 1
0
(PH;t (z) =PH;t)
 "p dz denotes relative price dispersion. Market clearing in the
7The same holds for Foreign good varieties: PF;t (z0) = P F;t (z
0) for all z0 2 [0; 1], such that
PF;t = P

F;t.
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intermediate good market thus requires
kkt 1
 
het 1
h (net )1 h k = ytt:
Aggregate demand for the basket of Home good varieties is given by,
yt = c
c
H;t + c
u
H;t + c
e
H;t + iH;t + i
h
H;t + gt + xt: (16)
Total demand for real estate must equal total supply,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1  h)
 
ht 1 + hut 1 + h
e
t 1

:
Total demand for equipment capital must equal total supply: kt = It + (1  k) kt 1.
Labor market clearing requires nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t . We dene real (PPI-deated) per
capita GDP as
gdpt  yt + Pt
PH;t
(qtIt   it) + Pt
PH;t
 
pht I
h
t   iht

=
Pt
PH;t
ctott +
Pt
PH;t
 
qtIt + p
h
t I
h
t

+

xt   PF;t
PH;t
 
ctotF;t + iF;t + i
h
F;t

;
where in the second equality we have used (16) and zH;t = PtPH;t zt  
PF;t
PH;t
zF;t for
z = cc; cu; ce; i; ih, and where ctott  cct+cut +cet is total consumption (total consumption
imports ctotF;t are dened analogously).
Zero net supply of nominal international bonds requires
sPtnfat + (1  s)P t nfat = 0;
where the Cores real per capita net foreign asset position, nfat , is dened analo-
gously to (15). We may combine all domestic market-clearing conditions and budget
constraints to obtain the Peripherys current account identity,
nfat =
Rt 1
t
nfat 1 +
PH;t
Pt
xt   PF;t
Pt
 
ctotF;t + iF;t + i
h
F;t

:
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2.8 Calibration and solution method
We calibrate our two-country monetary union model to the European Monetary
Union, where the country labelled Periphery broadly represents the member states
in the so-called EMU Periphery. As explained in the introduction, we are motivated
by the recent experience of the peripheral EMU economies, where the private sector
is still embarked in a gradual deleveraging process, and for which structural reforms
in product and labor markets have been advocated as a means of fostering economic
recovery.
The share of the total population that lives in the Periphery is set to s = 1=3,
following Blanchard et al. (2014). The rest of the calibration closely follows Andrés,
Arce and Thomas (2014), who calibrate a similar model to the Spanish economy.8
The time period is a quarter. Some parameters will be calibrated by matching the
models steady state to a number of empirical targets in 2007, the year prior to the
start of the international nancial crisis.9
The discount factor of the impatient agents is set to  = 0:98, following Iacoviello
(2005). For patient households, we choose u = 1:025 1=4, which is consistent with
a steady state nominal interest rate of Rss = 1:0251=4ss = RMUe  (nfa
y
ss). We set
the long-run ination target MU to 1, which implies ss = ss = 1 in a stationary
equilibrium. Choosing RMU = 1:021=4 for the nominal policy interest rate, we then
set  to replicate net foreign assets over GDP in 2007, nfayss =  79:3%. The inverse
labor supply elasticity is set to ' = 4, consistently with a large body of micro
evidence. The weight parameter in the consumption basket, !H , is set to match
gross exports over GDP in 2007 (26.9%). Based on evidence for Spain in García et
al. (2009), the price elasticity of exports and imports is set to "F = "H = 1.
The elasticities of substitution across varieties of consumption goods and labor
services, "p and "w, and the tax rates on retailersrevenue and labor income,  p and
w, determine the desired markups in product and labor markets, respectively. We set
8We thus opt for calibrating the Home country to Spain, rather than building consolidated
aggregates for the peripheral EMU economies.
9We do not claim, however, that the Spanish economy was in (or close to) a steady state in 2007.
Instead, our models steady state should be interpreted as the economys initial condition for the
purpose of our simulation exercises.
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"p = 7 and  p = 0, implying an initial price markup of (1   p) 1 "p=("p  1) = 1:17,
which is broadly consistent with estimates by Montero and Urtasun (2013) based
on Spanish rm-level data. Wage markups are hard to estimate empirically, so we
adopt an alternative calibration strategy. We follow Galí (2011) in reinterpreting
the EHL model of wage-setting in a way that delivers equilibrium unemployment
(see Appendix B for details). Targeting an unemployment rate of 8:6% in 2007, we
obtain an initial wage markup of (1  w) 1 "w=("w   1) = 1:43, which we achieve
by setting w = 0 and "w = 3:31.10
The elasticity of entrepreneurial output with respect to equipment capital and
commercial real estate are set to k = 0:11 and h = 0:21, which are chosen to repli-
cate the labor share of GDP in 2007 (61.6%) and the share of equipment capital in the
total stock of productive capital.11 As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) we set h = 0:01,
whereas k is set to a standard value of 0:025. The elasticity of construction output
with respect to labor ! is set to match the construction share of total employment
in 2007 (13:4%). The weight of utility from housing services, #, is chosen to repli-
cate gross household debt over annual GDP (80:2%). The share of constrained and
unconstrained workers in the labor baskets are set to h = e   = 1=2. The scale
parameters of convex investment adjustment costs, h and k, are chosen such that
the fall in construction and equipment capital investment in our baseline deleveraging
scenario resembles their behavior during the crisis.12
The Calvo parameters are set to p = 2=3 and w = 3=4, such that prices and
wages are adjusted every 3 and 4 quarters on average, respectively. This is consistent
with survey evidence for the Spanish economy (see e.g. Druant et al., 2009).
10Our choice of p and w is motivated as follows. In this paper, we implement structural reforms
by changing the elasticity parameters "p and "w. Setting p = w = 0 allows us to isolate the
e¤ects of structural reforms from additional scal e¤ects operating through the budget constraint
of constrained households (in particular, through changes in lump-sum taxes Tt). See Andrés, Arce
and Thomas (2015) for a discussion of the e¤ects of reforms implemented via reductions in p and
w.
11Using data from BBVA Research, we obtain that the value of equipment capital was 21:4% of
the total value of productive capital in 2007.
12In particular, we set h and k such that the accumulated fall in construction and equipment
capital investment 8 quarters after the nancial shock replicate their accumulated fall 8 quarters
after their peak in 2007:Q4 (24:5% and 28% respectively).
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
s 1/3 relative size of Home country
Preferences
u; u 0.994 unconstrained household discount factor
;  0.98 constrained household discount factor
';' 4 (inverse) labor supply elasticity
#; # 0.38 weight on housing utility
"p; "

p 7 elasticity of subst. across consumption varieties
"w; "

w 3.31 elasticity of substitution across labor varieties
!H ; !

F 0.72, 0.86 weight on domestic goods in consumption basket
"H ; "F 1 elast. of subst. between domestic and imported goods
Technology
h; 

h 0.21 elasticity output wrt real estate
k; 

k 0.11 elasticity output wrt equipment
!; ! 0.43 elasticity construction wrt labor
h; 

h 0.01 depreciation real estate
k; 

k 0.025 depreciation equipment
;  0.5 share of constr. households in labor baskets
h;

h 6.1 investment adjustment costs construction
k;

k 2.4 investment adjustment costs equipment
Price/wage setting
p; 

p 0.67 fraction of non-adjusting prices
w; 

w 0.75 fraction of non-adjusting wages
Debt constraints
m; m 0.70 household LTV ratio
me; me 0.64 entrepreneur LTV ratio
;  0.98 amortization rate household debt
e; e 0.97 amortization rate entrepreneurial debt
Monetary policy
; RMU 1.5, 1.021=4 Taylor rule coe¢ cient, long-run policy rate
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The parameters that regulate the debt constraints are calibrated as follows. Ac-
cording to data from the Spanish Land Registry o¢ ce, loan-to-value ratios (LTV)
for new mortgages prior to the crisis were slightly below 70 percent. We thus set
m = 0:70 for the households initial loan-to-value ratio. The entrepreneurial initial
loan-to-value ratio is chosen to match the ratio of gross non-nancial corporate debt
to annual GDP (125:4% in 2007), which yields me = 0:64. Finally, we calibrate the
contractual amortization rates, 1  and 1 e, in order to replicate the average age
of the stock of outstanding mortgage debt prior to the crisis. This yields 1  = 0:02
and 1  e = 0:03 per quarter.13
For the Core, for simplicity we assume a fully symmetric calibration, with two
exceptions. First, the weight on Periphery goods in the consumption basket of Core
consumers, !F , is set in order to normalize the terms-of-trade in the initial steady
state to 1.14 Second, we allow for an additional parameter in the interest rate pre-
mium of the Core and set it such that interest rates are the same in both countries
in the initial steady state.15
Finally, we assume a standard value of 1.5 for the Taylor rule coe¢ cient , which
together with the long-run target for the policy rate chosen above ( RMU = 1:021=4)
completes the specication of the monetary policy rule. Table 1 summarizes the
calibration.
13Under our debt contracts (with a constant fraction of outstanding debt amortized each period),
the average age of the debt stock converges in the steady state to = (1  ) and e= (1  e)
for households and entrepreneurs, respectively. According to calculations by Banco de España,
based on data from the Land Registry o¢ ce and large nancial institutions, the average age of
outstanding mortgage debt prior to the crisis was close to 12.5 years for households and 8 years for
nonnancial corporations and entrepreneurs. This yields  = 12:5  4=(12:5  4 + 1) = 0:98 and
e = 8 4=(8 4 + 1) = 0:97.
14Unlike in the case of !H , which was calibrated to match an exports target for the Home country
(equivalently, an imports target, given the target for the NFA-to-GDP ratio), !F cannot be targeted
to the Foreign countrys exports because these must equal the Home countrys imports in the model.
15In particular, we assume Rt = R
MU
t exp [   (P t nfat =PF;tgdpt ) +  0] , with   =  , and set
 0 such that Rss = R

ss.
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2.8.1 Solution method
We assume perfect foresight in all our simulations. We solve for the fully nonlinear
equilibrium path, using a variant of the Newton-Raphson algorithm developed by
La¤argue (1990), Boucekkine (1995) and Juillard (1996) (LBJ). As discussed in the
previous section, our assumption of long-run debt contracts gives rise to two debt
regimes for households and entrepreneurs. If collateral values are above the contrac-
tual debt amortization paths, then debt levels are restricted by the former, according
to equations (6) and (9). If the opposite holds, then new credit ows collapse to zero
and debt is restricted by the contractual amortization path (equations 7 and 10).
Moreover, the presence of the ZLB on nominal interest rates (see equation 13) im-
plies that the economy may also switch endogenously between two monetary policy
regimes, depending on whether the ZLB binds or not. We have therefore extended
the LBJ algorithm to allow for endogenous changes of both debt and monetary policy
regimes. In particular, the dates at which these regime changes take place are solved
as equilibrium objects.
3 Baseline scenario: deleveraging and the ZLB
In this section we construct a baseline scenario that is meant to capture some impor-
tant features of the current economic situation in the EMU and, particularly, in its
peripheral economies. On the one hand, the latter economies are experiencing a pro-
tracted process of private-sector deleveraging. With this aim, we will rst simulate
the e¤ects of a deleveraging shock in the Periphery, assuming the common monetary
authority is able to reduce nominal interest rates so as to partially counteract the
resulting fall in union-wide ination.
On the other hand, the European Central Bank is currently restricted in its ability
to further reduce nominal interest rates, as the latter are already very close to the
zero bound. Thus, we will consider a second scenario in which, simultaneously to
the deleveraging shock, a negative union-wide demand shock occurs that pushes the
monetary authoritys nominal interest rate against its ZLB. The latter scenario, with
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both private sector deleveraging in the Periphery and a binding ZLB, will constitute
the main baseline scenario with respect to which we will evaluate the e¤ects of, and
synergies between, alternative macroeconomic policies.
3.1 Adjustment to deleveraging out of the ZLB
In order to better understand the e¤ects of a deleveraging shock in our model of collat-
eral constraints and long-run debt, we rst subject the model economy to a negative
nancial shock in the Periphery that reduces the availability of credit for borrowers.
Our credit crunchconsists of an unexpected, gradual, permanent drop in the LTV
ratios of both households and entrepreneurs, mt and met respectively. In particular,
we assume an autoregressive process for both LTV ratios: xt = (1  x) x + xxt 1,
x = m;me, where we set m = m
e
= 0:75. We then simulate an unanticipated fall in
the long-run LTV ratios ( m; me) of 7:5 percentage points from their baseline values
in Table 1, which accords well with recent experience in Spain.16
Figure 1 displays the response to the credit crunch of collateral values and con-
tractual amortization paths, together with the actual equilibrium path of outstand-
ing debt, both for entrepreneurs and households in the Periphery. Before the shock
(t = 0), the economy rests in the steady state of the baseline regime, where debt levels
equal pledgeable collateral values.17 The credit crunch shock drives collateral values
below the contractual amortization paths already on impact (t = 1). Therefore, the
economy switches on impact to the alternative regime in which entrepreneurial and
household debt stocks decay at the contractual amortization rates. In this phase,
the economy undergoes a gradual and prolonged deleveraging process.
Eventually, collateral values rise again above the contractual amortization path,
at which point borrowers are able to regain access to fresh funds. We denote by T 
and T  the time at which the endogenous regime change takes place for entrepreneurs
16Data from the Spanish Land Registry o¢ ce shows that average LTV ratios for new mortgages
declined by 7.7 percentage points in the 6 years between 2007:Q3 and 2013:Q3.
17Indeed, the fact that constrained households and entrepreneurs are both more impatient than
unconstrained households,  < u, guarantees that the collateral constraint binds for both agents
in the steady state.
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Figure 1: Debt dynamics after a deleveraging shock in the Periphery
and households, respectively. Notice that collateral values and debt both experience
a surge at the time of the regime change. This is because real estate becomes again
valuable as collateral (see equations 8 and 11), which pushes up borrowersdemand
for real estate, and hence its price. Thus, T  and T  also represent the duration of
the deleveraging phase for entrepreneurs and households. In the scenario analyzed
here, the equilibrium duration of the deleveraging phase is T  = 10 quarters for
entrepreneurs and T  = 17 quarters for households, the latter being longer due
mainly to the lower amortization rate of household debt (1   < 1  e).18
Figure 2 shows the response of both countries to the deleveraging shock in the
Periphery.19 In the latter, the shock produces a deep and protracted recession, which
ends around the period in which entrepreneurs regain access to new loans (t = 10).
18Figure 1 shows that the debt constraints (7) and (10) are binding during t = 1; :::; T    1
and t = 1; :::; T    1, respectively, whereas the collateral constraints (6 and 9) are binding for
t  T  and t  T , respectively. We have veried that the corresponding Lagrange multipliers are
indeed strictly positive in the relevant periods, both in the baseline scenario and in all subsequent
simulations. Results are available upon request.
19In all gures, all variables are in %, except interest rates (real and nominal), which are in
annualized percentage points.
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Such recession is due to the fall in domestic demand (consumption and investment);
the latter is only partially counteracted by an improvement in net exports, thanks
to the Peripherys improvement in competitiveness vis-à-vis the Core in the rst few
years and the contraction in domestic demand.20. The resulting union-wide deation
leads the monetary authority to reduce nominal interest rates according to the Taylor
rule, which produces a mild economic expansion in the Core.
3.2 Adjustment to deleveraging at the ZLB
We move next to our main baseline scenario, where, contemporaneously to the
deleveraging shock in the Periphery, a common negative demand shock a¤ects both
countries. In particular, we assume an unanticipated temporary increase in con-
sumersdiscount factors. Assuming t = 

t 1e
ut , we set u1 = 0:005, i.e. discount
factors increase on impact by 2 annualized percentage points, and  = 0:90; we
choose this calibration such that the short-run fall in union-wide GDP replicates
approximately that of EMU GDP during the last recession.21
As shown in Figure 3, the fall in union-wide ination in this scenario is large
enough to make the monetary authoritys nominal interest rate hit the ZLB constraint
on impact. After 4 quarters, the latter constraint ceases to bind, and nominal interest
rates increase gradually in sync with union-wide ination. Not surprisingly, this
scenario is more severe for both countries than that displayed in Figure 2: peripheral
GDP falls more on impact, whereas the core now enters in recession for a few quarters.
Overall, our baseline scenario draws a picture of prolonged economic downturn and
persistently low ination at the union level.
20The response of variables such as consumption, investment, terms-of-trade and net exports are
not shown in the gures for brevity, but are available upon request.
21In particular, union-wide GDP falls by about 0.85% in the rst two quarters of the simulation.
This is close to the accumulated fall in EMU GDP in the rst two quarters of the last recession,
which amounted to 0.96%.
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Figure 2: The e¤ects of a deleveraging shock in the Periphery
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Figure 3: Baseline scenario: deleveraging in the Periphery and a binding ZLB
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4 Macroeconomic policies at the ZLB
The baseline scenario constructed in the previous section is meant to broadly capture
some of the main macroeconomic di¢ culties that the EMU currently faces: sluggish
aggregate demand (aggravated in the Periphery by an ongoing deleveraging process),
persistently low ination, and nominal interest rates at their zero bound. Such a
scenario poses signicant challenges for economic authorities in the EMU. Among the
measures considered in order to foster recovery in the euro area, three have attracted
particular attention from the economic authorities: (i) structural reforms in product
and factor markets in countries with weaker public nances (mainly countries in the
periphery); (ii) countercyclical scal policies in those economies with scal room to
implement them (all of them in the core), and (iii) non-standard monetary policy
measures by the ECB aimed at pushing down the interest rate curve beyond the
zero-constrained short-end, such as forward guidance about the future path of policy
interest rates.22
We now use our model to analyze the e¤ects of these economic policy measures.
We start by looking at the e¤ects of country-specic policies: structural reforms and
countercyclical scal policies.
4.1 Country-specic policies: structural reforms and scal
expansion
Structural reforms. We implement structural reforms by means of an unanticipated,
permanent reduction in desired price and wage markups in the Periphery, "p= ("p   1)
and "w= ("w   1) respectively. Both are assumed to fall by 1%, following Eggerts-
son et al. (2014).23 Figure 4 displays the marginal e¤ects of these reforms (i.e.
with respect to the baseline scenario without such reforms), depending on whether
the baseline scenario features the union-wide negative demand shock, i.e. a binding
22See, for example, Draghi (2014), Coeuré (2014), European Commission (2014), and IMF (2014).
23In particular, "p increases from 7 to 7.45, and "w increases from 3.31 to 3.39.
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ZLB.24 As a natural outcome of the greater degree of competition and e¢ ciency in
product and labour markets, structural reforms give rise to transitory lower ina-
tion rates. This deationary pressure tends to depress ceteris paribus the aggregate
demand in the Periphery, via the increase in the real value of debt (debt deation
channel). The latter e¤ect is amplied when nominal interest rates cannot be reduced
further (dashed lines in Figure 4), thereby prompting an increase in real short-term
interest rates that adversely impacts on consumption and investment.
These contractionary e¤ects are however dominated, even in the short term, by a
combination of expansionary channels. First, reforms have permanent positive e¤ects
on income and consumption, the anticipation of which leads to higher consumption
and investment in the short-run. Second, the previous e¤ect also benets demand for
real estate, pushing up its price and the value of borrowerscollateral. This collateral
channelfosters spending by borrowers once they regain access to new loans, thus
reinforcing the medium and long-run gains in activity. Third, the improvement in the
Peripherys competitiveness vis-à-vis the core gives rise to a signicant and lasting
increase in its exports and in domestic demand for its own goods. All these e¤ects
give rise to a strong positive e¤ect on peripheral GDP.
In the Core, the spillover e¤ect from these reforms depends critically on the
incidence of the ZLB. Outside of it, the reduction in the nominal policy interest rate
produces a (small) increase in GDP. At the ZLB, however, monetary policy cannot
counteract the Cores loss of competitiveness, giving rise to a temporary contraction.
Fiscal expansion. We now consider the e¤ects of a scal expansion in the Core,
implemented through an exogenous temporary increase in government expenditure.
Assuming gt = gg

t 1+u
g
t , we set u
g
1 such that g

t increases on impact by 1% of (ex-
ante) Core GDP, or 0.67% of (ex-ante) union-wide GDP, which closely resembles the
size of the initial public contribution to the so-called Juncker planfor the nancing
of public infrastructures;25 we also set g = 0:75, such that the plan has a half-life
24In gures 4 through 9, which display the marginal e¤ects of alternative macroeconomic poli-
cies, spikes typically reect policy-induced changes in the endogenous duration of householdsand
entrepreneursdeleveraging processes (T ; T ).
25The Juncker plan(technically, European Fund for Strategic Investments) aims for an initial
push to direct public investment of 63 bn euros, i.e. 0.66% of 2014 EMU GDP. In broader terms,
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Figure 4: Marginal e¤ects of structural reforms in the Periphery
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of about a year. As reected in Figure 5, the scal stimulus deploys clearly positive
e¤ects on the Cores economic activity, but has opposing e¤ects on the Peripherys
GDP depending on whether the economy is in a liquidity trap.
When monetary policy is not restricted by the ZLB, the positive e¤ects of stronger
activity in the Core on the Periphery through the exports channel is neutralized by
the monetary tightening in response to higher union-wide ination. The net spillover
e¤ect on the Periphery is actually negative in the short term, although it disappears
quickly. By contrast, at the ZLB, the inationary pressure stemming from the Core
causes a reduction in real interest rates in both countries. This favors the Periphery
both through higher exports (thanks to higher spending in the Core) and higher
domestic demand, the result being a relatively sizable and persistent positive spillover
e¤ect.
4.2 Forward guidance about monetary policy
The previous subsection has considered the e¤ects of country-specic policies, and
how such e¤ects depend on the incidence of the ZLB. We now turn our attention to
the e¤ects of forward guidanceby the common monetary authority when the latter
is constrained by the ZLB.
Figure 6 shows the e¤ects (relative to our baseline scenario with a binding ZLB)
that would follow from a commitment by the central bank to keep interest rates at
zero for two more quarters than what its Taylor rule would dictate in the baseline
scenario, i.e. until period t = 5 included.26 This non-standard monetary policy
measure allows to boost GDP in both regions in the short run. The main channel,
common to both regions, is the reduction in long-run real interest rates relative to
the baseline scenario. The subsequent expansion in activity prompts an increase in
ination in both regions which, coupled with the fact that the nominal policy rate
is stuck at zero for a number of periods, amplies the decline in long-run real rates
the plan aims for an increase in total (public and private) investment of about 315 bn euros, or
3.3% of euro-area GDP, over a period of three years (2015-2017).
26As explained in Section 3.2, in the baseline scenario the policy rate exits the liquidity trap at
t = 4:
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Figure 5: Marginal e¤ects of a scal expansion in the Core
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Figure 6: Marginal e¤ects of forward guidance
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and hence the positive impact on economic activity.
It is worth emphasizing that forward guidance produces signicant expansionary
e¤ects on both countries, which are of similar magnitude on impact, in spite of the
presence of binding collateral constraints. This non-Ricardian feature is particularly
acute in the Periphery since, while deleveraging, no new credit ows to existing
debtors. Absent this last feature of the model, forward guidance would produce an
irrealistically high expansionary e¤ect on impact,27 an issue that has received some
attention in the recent literature on forward guidance in DSGE models (the forward
guidance puzzle).28
5 Policy synergies
The previous exercises show that the three types of policies considered have the
potential to alleviate the costs associated with negative real and nancial shocks.
The three policies however are implemented by di¤erent authorities: the two national
governments, and the common monetary authority. As discussed before, in policy
circles increasing attention is being devoted to the potential gains that could be
achieved if the di¤erent authorities within the EMU were to jointly implement their
respective policy/reform packages. Thus, a key question to ask in the context of
our model is whether some complementarities or synergies exist between the policies
considered thus far. In particular, we now investigate to what extent each policy
reinforces the e¤ects of the other. The non-linear nature of our model (together with
our reliance on a fully non-linear solution method) makes it well suited for analyzing
this issue.
We start by quantifying how forward guidance modies the e¤ectiveness of country-
specic policies. Figure 7 compares the marginal e¤ects of jointly implementing
structural reforms in the Periphery and scal expansion in the Core vis-à-vis two
27Specically, in the model version in which the Periphery does not enter the slow deleveraging
regime, the impact of forward guidance would be of around two and a half time bigger than the
one in our baseline .
28See e.g. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2013), De Graeve, Ilbas, and Wouters (2014),
McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2015).
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di¤erent reference scenarios that di¤er in the monetary policy stance: one in which
the monetary authority passively follows its ZLB-constrained Taylor rule (which cor-
responds to our baseline scenario in section 3.2), and one in which the monetary
authority implements a forward guidance policy as formulated in the previous sub-
section. Clearly, country-specic policies are more e¤ective, both in the Periphery
and the Core, when in parallel to such policies the central bank commits to a lower
future path for its policy rate.
We now analyze to what extent the implementation of national policies favors
or hinders the e¤ectiveness of forward guidance by the common monetary authority.
Figure 8 compares the marginal e¤ects of forward guidance relative to two di¤erent
scenarios: one in which national authorities implement their respective policy pack
(reforms in the Periphery, scal expansion in the Core), and one in which they do not.
Again, we nd sizable synergies between both groups of policies: forward guidance is
more e¤ective in fostering economic activity, both in the Core and in the Periphery,
when governments in the latter countries carry out their respective measures.
To summarize, our analysis suggests that, in a scenario characterized by a liquid-
ity trap and a prolonged deleveraging process in a sizable part of the monetary union,
the joint implementation of country-specic policy stimuli and forward guidance by
the common monetary authority may give rise to rst-order gains in short-run eco-
nomic activity, not just in the union as a whole but also in each individual country.
5.1 Inspecting the synergy channels
So far we have analyzed the synergies between forward guidance, on the one hand,
and a combination of country-specic policies, on the other. In order to gain further
insights on the sources of these synergies, here we analyze the interaction between
forward guidance and individual country-specic policies, i.e. we consider separately
structural reforms in the Periphery and scal expansion in the Core. Moreover, we
also distinguish between reforms in product markets and labor markets, as both
types of reforms may di¤er in their potential for synergies. Figure 9 displays the
marginal e¤ects of (i) a labor market reform, (ii) a product market reform, both in
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Figure 7: Marginal e¤ects of national policies, with and without forward guidance
in the baseline
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Figure 8: Marginal e¤ects of forward guidance, with and without national policies
in the baseline
39
the Periphery, and (iii) scal expansion in the Core, relative to two di¤erent reference
scenarios: one where the monetary authority follows the ZLB-constrained Taylor
rule (the baseline scenario described in section 3.2), and one where it announces and
applies forward guidance. Again, the latter is dened as a commitment to keeping
nominal interest rates at zero until 2 quarters after the lift-o¤ date in the baseline,
no-policy-change scenario. We nd that, unlike the labor market reform, the product
market reform displays negative synergies with forward guidance, whereas the scal
expansion in the core has clearly positive synergies.
To understand these results, we focus on two di¤erent mechanisms through which
synergies arise in our framework. On the one hand, country-specic policies unleash
positive e¤ects on domestic GDP that go beyond the short term. This is particu-
larly the case for structural reforms (both in product and labor markets), as these
have permanent expansionary e¤ects on the Peripherys GDP, as shown by the solid
lines in Figure 9. Thus, the fall in long-run real interest rates induced by forward
guidance amplies the present-discounted value of such future expansionary e¤ects.
This induces an additional stimulus in current consumption and investment deci-
sions, giving rise to an increase in area-wide economic activity and ination in the
short term. We may refer to this channel as the discounting e¤ect.
On the other hand, country-specic policies imply di¤erent endogenous e¤ects
on the nominal interest rate path when monetary policy follows the standard ZLB-
constrained Taylor rule. As shown in Figure 10, a demand-side stimulus such as a
scal expansion in the Core brings forward the lift-o¤ date for the policy rate by 1
quarter, which tends to bu¤er the expansionary impact of this measure.29 However,
if the central bank commits to keeping interest rates at zero for longer than what
the Taylor rule would imply in the baseline, then the same scal expansion does not
produce an upward shift in the nominal interest rate path relative to the no-expansion
reference scenario. As a result, forward guidance strengthens the e¤ects of the scal
expansion, i.e. a positive synergy arises. By contrast, a supply-side measure such as
a structural reform has the opposite e¤ect on monetary policy. As shown by Figure
29See Erceg and Lindé (2014) for an in-depth analysis of the e¤ects of government spending
shocks at the ZLB when the lift-o¤ date is endogenous to the size of such shocks.
40
Figure 9: GDP synergies between country-specic policies and forward guidance
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Figure 10: E¤ects of country-specic policies on nominal interest rates and ination
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10, the product market reform (i.e. the 1% reduction in desired price markups) is not
deationary enough to delay the lift-o¤ date, but it does moderate the magnitude of
the nominal interest rate increase once the latter exits the ZLB, which strengthens
the expansionary e¤ect of the reform. Following the same logic as before, forward
guidance partially undoes the positive e¤ect from the reform. We may refer to this
channel as the lift-o¤ e¤ect.30
In light of these two channels, we can better understand the di¤erence in the
sign and size of synergies between forward guidance and di¤erent country-specic
policies. In the case of the scal expansion in the Core, the lift-o¤ date e¤ect is par-
ticularly important in generating positive synergies with forward guidance; whereas
the discounting e¤ect is relatively less important as the expansionary e¤ects are
rather short-lived. The product market reform features both the (positive) discount-
ing e¤ect and a negative lift-o¤ e¤ect. Quantitatively, the second e¤ect dominates,
giving rise to the negative synergies with forward guidance. Finally, the labor market
reform features a similar discounting e¤ect but essentially no lift-o¤ e¤ect, because it
is much less deationary than the comparable product market reform.31 As a result,
it generates positive synergies.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have provided a general equilibrium framework for analyzing the e¤ects of supply
and demand side policies, the associated cross-country spillovers, and the potential
synergies between such policies, in an asymmetric monetary union that faces a liq-
uidity trap and a slow deleveraging process in its periphery. The set of policies that
we consider is inspired by the current situation in the EMU. On the demand side, we
30Strictly speaking, neither the product nor the labor market reform delay the lift-o¤ date relative
to the baseline. Therefore, the lift-o¤ e¤ect in this case refers to the intensity of the nominal rate
increase once outside of the ZLB. For larger price markup reductions than the one assumed here
(1%), the product market reform does delay the lift-o¤ date. Results are available upon request.
31As emphasized by Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2015), reductions in desired wage markups must
overcome a double layer of nominal rigidities (rst wages, then prices) before a¤ecting actual pro-
duction prices.
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analyze (i) the e¤ects of forward guidance about the future path of nominal policy
interest rates, as a means of alleviating the constraints imposed by a binding ZLB
on short-term rates; and (ii) those of a scal expansion in the core, i.e. in those
countries in the union with su¢ cient scal capacity to implement such an expansion.
On the supply side, we study the role of pro-competition structural reforms in the
periphery.
In terms of spillovers, we nd that the e¤ects of national policies on other coun-
tries depend crucially on whether monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. Thus,
deationary structural reforms in the periphery tend to create (small) contractionary
e¤ects in the corewhen the monetary authority cannot accommodate such a de-
ationary pressure. On the contrary, a scal expansion in the core may benet the
periphery provided the monetary authority is stuck at the ZLB and hence does not
react to the resulting inationary pressure.
As regards the synergies across these policies, we nd potentially sizable short-run
economic gains from their joint implementation. Thus, forward-guidance reinforces
the expansionary e¤ects of country-specic policies, and the latter in turn improve
the e¤ectiveness of forward guidance. Two prominent channels through which these
synergies take places are the following. First, forward guidance lowers long-run real
interest rates and hence increases the present-discounted value of the future output
and consumption gains produced by national stimulus policies, thus fostering invest-
ment and consumption already in the short-run. Second, under our implementation
of forward guidance, the latter reinforces the expansionary e¤ects of demand-side pol-
icy stimuli, such as a scal expansion, by avoiding the upward shift in the nominal
interest rate path that such stimuli would otherwise produce.
It should be stressed that our results are conditional on our assumed form of
forward guidance. Exploring the synergies between country-specic policies and
forward guidance for alternative formulations of the latter is an important avenue
for further research.
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Appendix
A. Equilibrium conditions
In order to express all equations in terms of stationary variables, we dene pH;t 
PH;t=Pt, H;t  PH;t=PH;t 1 (PPI ination), p^t  PH;t=PF;t (terms of trade), ~pt 
~PH;t=PH;t, wt  Wt=Pt, ~wt  ~Wt=Wt, wt  Wt=Wt 1; analogously for the Foreign
economy: pF;t  P F;t=P t , F;t  P F;t=P F;t 1, p^t  PF;t=PH;t, etc.
Home country
 Unconstrained household budget constraint and rst-order conditions (cut , dt,
hut ),
ut =
t
cut
; (17)
cut + dt + p
h
t

hut   (1  h)hut 1

=
Rt 1
t
dt 1 + (1  w)wtnut   Tt; (18)
ut = 
uEt
Rt
t+1
ut+1; (19)
ut p
h
t =
t#
hut
+ uEt
u
t+1 (1  h) pht+1: (20)
 Constrained household budget constraint, debt constraints, and rst-order con-
ditions (cct , bt, ht),
ct =
t
cct
; (21)
cct +
Rt 1
t
bt 1 + pht [ht   (1  h)ht 1] = bt + (1  w)wtnct   Tt; (22)
bt 
(
R 1t mtEtt+1p
h
t+1ht; if mtR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1ht  bt 1=t;
bt 1=t; if mtR 1t Ett+1p
h
t+1ht < bt 1=t;
(23)
ct = Et
Rt
t+1
ct+1+ t1 ({t  0)+t1 ({t < 0) Et
t+1
t+1
1 (#t+1 < 0) ; (24)
49
ctp
h
t =
t#
ht
+ Et
c
t+1 (1  h) pht+1 + t1 ({t  0)
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1; (25)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (7) in the text, 1 () is the
indicator function and {t  R 1t mtEtt+1pht+1ht   bt 1=t.
 Entrepreneur budget constraint, debt constraints, and rst-order conditions
(cet , b
e
t , h
e
t , n
e
t , kt),
et =
t
cet
; (26)
cet = mctk
k
t 1
 
het 1
h (net )1 h k   wtnet   pht het   (1  h)het 1
+bet  
Rt 1
t
bet 1   qt [kt   (1  k) kt 1] + rt + ht + kt ; (27)
bet 
(
R 1t m
e
tEtt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t ; if m
e
tR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t  ebet 1=t;
ebet 1=t; if m
e
tR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < 
ebet 1=t;
(28)
et = Et
Rt
t+1
et+1 + 
e
t1 ({et  0) + et1 ({et < 0)  eEt
et+1
t+1
1
 
#et+1 < 0

;
(29)
etp
h
t = Et
e
t+1
h
mct+1hk
k
t (h
e
t )
h 1  net+11 h k + (1-h) pht+1i+etmetRt Ett+1pht+11 ({et  0) ;
(30)
wt = mct (1  h   k) kkt 1
 
het 1
h (net ) h k ; (31)
etqt = Et
e
t+1
h
mct+1kk
k 1
t (h
e
t )
h
 
net+1
1 h k + (1  k) qt+1i ; (32)
where et is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (7) in the text, and {et 
R 1t m
e
tEtt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t   ebet 1=t.
 Retailersoptimal price decision, and aggregate prots,
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s 
e
t+s
et
"
(1   p) ~ptQs
j=1 H;t+j
pH;t+s   "p
"p   1mct+s
# Qs
j=1 H;t+j
~pt
!"p
yt+s = 0;
(33)
rt = yt ((1   p) pH;t  mctt) ; (34)
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 Dynamics of PPI ination and price dispersion,
1 = (1  p) ~p1 "pt + p"p 1H;t ; (35)
t  (1  p) ~p "pt + p"pH;tt 1: (36)
 Construction rm output, rst order conditions (nht , iht ), and prots,
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nht
!(
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2

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iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
; (37)
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; (38)
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t I
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for diht  iht =iht 1   1.
 Equipment capital producers output, rst order condition (it), and prots,
It = it
"
1  k
2

it
it 1
  1
2#
; (41)
1 = qt

1  k
2
(dit)
2   k (dit) it
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
+ Et
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et
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for dit  it=it 1   1.
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 Optimal wage decision,
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with c = .
 Dynamics of wage ination and wage dispersion,
1 = (1  w) ~w1 "wt + w"w 1wt ; (45)
w;nt = (1  w) ~w "wt + w"wwtw;nt 1: (46)
 Fiscal authoritys budget constraint,
wwt (n
c
t + n
u
t ) +  ppH;tyt + 2Tt = pH;tgt: (47)
 Aggregate employment,
N ct = n
c
t
w;n
t ; (48)
Nut = n
u
t 
w;n
t ; (49)
Nt = N
c
t +N
u
t ; (50)
 Export demand,
xt =
1  s
s
(1  !F )
 
p^tp

F;t
 "F  cct + cut + cet + it + iht  : (51)
 Intermediate good market clearing,
ytt = k
k
t 1
 
het 1
h (net )1 h k ; (52)
52
 Labor market clearing,
nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t : (53)
 Consumption goods basket market clearing,
yt = c
c
H;t + c
u
H;t + c
e
H;t + iH;t + i
h
H;t + gt + xt: (54)
 Real estate market clearing,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1  h)
 
ht 1 + hut 1 + h
e
t 1

: (55)
 Equipment capital market clearing,
kt = (1  k) kt 1 + It: (56)
 Real wages,
wt = wt 1
wt
t
; (57)
 Terms of trade,
p^t = p^t 1
H;t
F;t
: (58)
 Relative demand for domestic goods,
zH;t = !Hp
 "H
H;t zt; z = c
c; cu; ce; i; ih (59)
 Relative demand for constrained/unconstrained household labor,
(1  )nct = nut ; (60)
where   e = h.
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 Relative domestic producer prices,
p"H 1H;t = !H + (1  !H)p^"H 1t : (61)
 CPI ination,
1 "Ht =
!H
 
pt 1
1 "H
!H
 
pt 1
1 "H + 1  !H 1 "HH;t + 1  !H!H  pt 11 "H + 1  !H 1 "HF;t ; (62)
 Real (PPI-deated) GDP,
gdpt = yt +
1
pH;t
(qtIt   it) + 1
pH;t
 
pht I
h
t   iht

; (63)
 Gross nominal interest rate,
Rt = R
MU
t exp

  dt   bt   b
e
t
pH;tgdpt

: (64)
Foreign country
 Zero net supply of international bonds,
s (dt   bt   bet ) + (1  s)
pH;t
p^tpF;t
(dt   bt   bet ) = 0;
 Unconstrained household rst-order conditions (cut , dt , hut ),
ut =
t
cut
; (65)
ut = 
uEt
Rt
t+1
ut+1; (66)
ut p
h
t =
t#

hut
+ uEt
u
t+1 (1  h) pht+1: (67)
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 Constrained household budget constraint, debt constraints, and rst-order con-
ditions (cct , b

t , h

t ),
ct =
t
cct
; (68)
cct +
Rt 1
t
bt 1 + p
h
t

ht   (1  h)ht 1

= bt + (1   w)wtnct   T t ; (69)
bt 
(
R 1t m

tEt

t+1p
h
t+1h

t ; if m

tR
 1
t Et

t+1p
h
t+1h

t  bt 1=t ;
bt 1=

t ; if m

tR
 1
t Et

t+1p
h
t+1h

t < 
bt 1=

t ;
(70)
ct = 
Et
Rt
t+1
ct+1 + 

t1 ({t  0) + t1 ({t < 0)  Et
t+1
t+1
1
 
{t+1 < 0

;
(71)
ct p
h
t =
t#

ht
+ Et
c
t+1 (1  h) pht+1 + t1 ({t  0)
mt
Rt
Et

t+1p
h
t+1; (72)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (7) in the text, 1 () is the
indicator function and {t  R 1t mtEtt+1pht+1ht   bt 1=t .
 Entrepreneur budget constraint, debt constraints, and rst-order conditions
(cet , b
e
t , h
e
t , n
e
t , k

t ),
et =
t
cet
; (73)
cet = mc

t
 
kt 1
k  het 1h (net )1 h k   wtnet   pht het   (1  h)het 1
+bet  
Rt 1
t
bet 1   qt [kt   (1  k) kt 1] + rt + ht + kt ; (74)
bet 
(
R 1t m
e
t Et

t+1p
h
t+1h
e
t ; if m
e
t R
 1
t Et

t+1p
h
t+1h
e
t  ebet 1=t ;
ebet 1=

t ; if m
e
t R
 1
t Et

t+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < 
ebet 1=

t ;
(75)
et = 
Et
Rt
t+1
et+1+
e
t 1 ({et  0)+et 1 ({et < 0) eEt
et+1
t+1
1
 
{et+1 < 0

;
(76)
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et p
h
t = 
Et
e
t+1
h
mct+1

h (k

t )
k (het )
h 1  net+11 h k + (1  h) pht+1i
+et (m
e
t =R

t )Et

t+1p
h
t+11 ({et  0) ; (77)
wt = mc

t (1  h   k)
 
kt 1
k  het 1h (net ) h k ; (78)
et q

t = 
Et
e
t+1
h
mct+1

k (k

t )
k 1 (het )
h
 
net+1
1 h k + (1  k) qt+1i ;
(79)
where et is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (7) in the text, and {et 
R 1t m
e
t Et

t+1p
h
t+1h
e
t   ebet 1=t .
 Retailersoptimal price decision, and aggregate prots,
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s 
e
t+s
et
"  
1   p

~ptQs
j=1 F;t+j
pF;t+s  
"p
"p   1
mct+s
# Qs
j=1 F;t+j
~pt
!"p
yt+s = 0;
(80)
rt = y

t
 
1   p

pF;t  mctt

; (81)
 Dynamics of PPI ination and price dispersion,
1 =
 
1  p

(~pt )
1 "p + p (F;t)
"p 1 ; (82)
t 
 
1  p

(~pt )
 "p + p (F;t)
"p t 1: (83)
 Construction rm output, rst order conditions (nht , iht ), and prots,
Iht =
 
nht
! (
iht
"
1  

h
2

iht
iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
; (84)
wt = p
h
t !
  nht ! 1
(
iht
"
1  

h
2

iht
iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
; (85)
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1 = pht
 
nht
!
(1  !)

iht

1  

h
2
 
diht
2 ! 
1  

h
2
 
diht
2   h  diht  ihtiht 1

+
et+1
et
pht+1
 
nht+1
!
(1-!)

iht+1

1  

h
2
 
diht+1
2 !
hdi
h
t+1

iht+1
iht
2
; (86)
ht = p
h
t I
h
t   wtnht   iht ; (87)
for diht  iht =iht 1   1.
 Equipment capital producers output, rst order condition (it ), and prots,
It = i

t
"
1  

k
2

it
it 1
  1
2#
; (88)
1 = qt

1  

k
2
(dit )
2   k (dit )
it
it 1

+ Et
et+1
et
qt+1

kdi

t+1

it+1
it
2
; (89)
kt = q

t I

t   it ; (90)
for dit  it=it 1   1.
 Optimal wage decision,
X
x=c;u
Et
1X
s=0
(xw)
s
2664(1- w) ~wtsQ
j=1
wt+j
wt+s
1
xt+s
  t+s
 
nxt+s
'
("w   1) ="w
0BB@ ~wtsQ
j=1
wt+j
1CCA
 "w'3775
0BB@
sQ
j=1
wt+j
~wt
1CCA
"w
nxt+s = 0;
(91)
with c = .
 Dynamics of wage ination and wage dispersion,
1 = (1  w) ( ~wt )1 "

w + w (

wt)
"w 1 ; (92)
wt = (1  w) ( ~wt ) "

w + w (

wt)
"w wt 1: (93)
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 Fiscal authoritys budget constraint,
 ww

t (n
c
t + n
u
t ) + 

pp

F;ty

t + 2T

t = p

F;tg

t : (94)
 Aggregate employment,
N ct = n
c
t 
w
t ; (95)
Nut = n
u
t 
w
t ; (96)
Nt = N
c
t +N
u
t ; (97)
 Export demand,
xt =
s
1  s (1  !H) (p^

tpH;t)
 "F  cct + cut + cet + it + iht  : (98)
 Intermediate good market clearing,
yt

t =
 
kt 1
k  het 1h (net )1 h k ; (99)
 Labor market clearing,
nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t : (100)
 Consumption goods basket market clearing,
yt = c
c
F;t + c
u
F;t + c
e
F;t + i

F;t + i
h
F;t + g

t + x

t : (101)
 Real estate market clearing,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1  h)
 
ht 1 + h
u
t 1 + h
e
t 1

: (102)
 Equipment capital market clearing,
kt = (1  k) kt 1 + It : (103)
58
 Real wages,
wt = w

t 1
wt
t
; (104)
 Terms of trade,
p^t = 1=p^t: (105)
 Relative demand for domestic goods,
zF;t = !

F
 
pF;t
 "F zt ; z = cc; cu; ce; i; ih (106)
 Relative demand for constrained/unconstrained household labor,
(1  )nct = nut ; (107)
where   e = h.
 Relative domestic producer prices,
 
pF;t
"F 1 = !F + (1  !F ) (p^t )"F 1 : (108)
 CPI ination,
(t )
1 "F =
!F
 
p^t 1
1 "F
!F
 
p^t 1
1 "F + 1  !F 1 "FF;t + 1  !

F
!F
 
p^t 1
1 "F + 1  !F 1 "FH;t ;
(109)
 Real (PPI-deated) GDP,
gdpt = y

t +
1
pH;t
(qt I

t   it ) +
1
pH;t
 
pht I
h
t   iht

; (110)
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 Gross nominal interest rate,
Rt = R
MU
t exp
 
  d

t   bt   bet
pH;tgdp

t
+  0
!
: (111)
Union-wide variables
 Nominal policy interest rate,
RMUt =
 
RMU
1 R  RMUt 1 R  MUt (1 R) :
 Union-wide CPI ination rate,
MUt = st + (1  s) t :
B. Equilibrium unemployment
Following Galí (2011), we assume that each representative household consists of a
unit squared of individuals indexed by (i; j) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], where i represents the
variety of labor service provided by the individual and j indexes her disutility from
working, given by j'. Let nxt (i) denote the number of variety-i workers in household
x = c; u employed at time t. Total household disutility from working is given by

Z 1
0
Z nxt (i)
0
j'djdi = 
Z 1
0
nxt (i)
1+'
1 + '
di;
for x = c; u. Given the type-specic wage Wt (i), the number of type-i workers that
each household would like to send to work is given by
arg max
nxt (i)
(
xt
Wt (i)
Pt
nxt (i)  t
nxt (i)
1+'
1 + '
)
=

xt
t
Wt (i)
Pt
1='
 lxt (i) ;
for x = c; u, where xt  1=cxt . Unemployment in the market for type-i labor is
just the number of workers willing to work at the going wage minus e¤ective labor
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demand: ut (i) 
P
x=c;u l
x
t (i) 
P
x=c;u n
x
t (i) :Let
lxt 
Z 1
0
lxt (i) di =

xt
t
Wt
Pt
1=' Z 1
0

Wt (i)
Wt
1='
di =

xt
t
Wt
Pt
1='
w;lt ;
Nxt 
Z 1
0
nxt (i) di = n
x
t
Z 1
0

Wt (i)
Wt
 "w
di = nxt 
w;n
t ;
denote total household-specic labor supply and labor demand, respectively, for x =
c; u, where w;lt 
R 1
0
(Wt (i) =Wt)
1=' di and w;nt 
R 1
0
(Wt (i) =Wt)
 "w di are indexes
of wage dispersion. Then aggregate unemployment is
ut 
Z 1
0
ut (i) di = lt  Nt:
where lt 
P
x=c;u l
x
t and Nt 
P
x=c;uN
x
t are aggregate labor supply and labor
demand, respectively. Finally, the unemployment rate is uratet  ut=lt.
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